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Speak No Evil: Negligent Employment Referral and
the Employer's Duty to Warn (Or, How Employers
Can Have Their Cake and Eat It Too)
J. Bradley Buckhalter
The utility of deductive logic is great, but strictly limited. It will
not tell you what to believe, but only that, if you believe A, you
must believe B. . . . Deduction tells you what follows from your
premises, but does not tell you whether your premises are true.1
[Y]ou cannot have both truth and what you call civilisation.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Anyone who watches the evening news either knows or quickly
learns that the law places constraints both on what conduct it considers
wrongful and on what a lawyer can do about any given wrongful act.3
One of those constraints appears in the "no duty to act" rule of tort
doctrine, a rule which all lawyers learned early in their study of the
law.4 Briefly stated, the "no duty to act" rule holds that, with certain
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1. Bertrand Russell, The Art of Drawing Inferences, in THE ART OF PHILOSOPHIZING 37,
43 (1983).
2. IRIS MURDOCH, A SEVERED HEAD 64 (1986).
3. See, e.g., Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 3 (1988), reprinted in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, FOUNDATIONS 58 (D. Kelly Weisberg
ed., 1993).
4. Professor Bender relates how her own torts students reacted to the "no duty to act" rule:
"[A] majority of my students initially find this legal 'no duty' rule reprehensible. After the
rationale is explained and the students become immersed in the 'reasoned' analysis, and after they
take a distanced, objective posture informed by liberalism's concerns for autonomy and liberty,
many come to accept the legal rule that intuitively had seemed so wrong to them. They are
taught to reject their emotions, instincts, and ethics, and to view accidents and tragedies
abstractly, removed from their social and particularized contexts, and to apply instead rationally
derived universal principles and a vision of human nature as atomistic, self-interested, and as free
from constraint as possible." Id. at 67.
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exceptions, the law imposes on actors neither a duty to act for
another's benefit nor liability for failure to act.' Although the rule
continues in force in modern tort doctrine, it is slowly being eroded,
with courts sometimes imposing both a duty to act and liability for
failure to do so.6
Like others in the legal community, employment lawyers function
under the presumption that the law recognizes no general duty to act.
Those lawyers advise their employer clients that the law does not
require them to act affirmatively for the benefit of others except in
limited situations. Rather, employment lawyers counsel their clients
simply to take care that their conduct harms no one else. The law,
they tell their clients, says "you must not harm others"; the law does
not say "you must help others. '
With the recent emergence of defamation actions in the employ-
ment context, the "no duty to act" rule became a valuable tool in the
employment lawyer's box. Increasingly, discharged employees began
to file defamation actions against former employers who allegedly
disclosed malicious or unfavorable reference information about them.8
Lawyers relied on the "no duty to act" doctrine as a liability shield in
advising their clients that the law imposed no duty to disclose
unfavorable reference information about current and former employ-
ees, 9 even if prospective employers pointedly asked for such informa-
tion. By refusing to disclose unfavorable reference information,
employers could reduce their exposure to defamation liability.1 °
However, employers soon saw the trade-off for their reduced exposure
to liability, as it became increasingly difficult for them to obtain the
necessary background information about their own prospective
employees. "
The California Supreme Court's recent decision in Randi W v.
Muroc Joint Unified School District2 called into question the employ-
ment lawyer's presumably fail-safe advice that the law imposes no duty
5. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 56, at
373 (5th ed. 1984).
6. Id. at 377.
7. See generally Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References:
Problems of "Overdeterrence" and a Proposal for Reform, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 45, 48-49
(1995) [hereinafter Saxton, Flaws in the Laws].
8. Deborah Daniloff, Note, Employer Defamation: Reasons and Remedies for Declining
References and Chilled Communications in the Workplace, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 687, 687-88 (1989).
9. Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 7, at 48-49.
10. Id. at 48.
11. Daniloff, supra note 8, at 688-89.
12. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
[Vol. 22:265
Negligent Employment Referral
to act for another's benefit in the employment reference context. The
Muroc court held that, if an employer gives a reference for an employee
and if that employee presents a substantial and foreseeable risk of harm
to third persons, then a duty exists to disclose all material facts about
the employee that created the risk of harm." The Muroc decision
both generated academic debate 4 and triggered dismayed commentary
in legal trade journals.'"
While stepping away from traditional tort doctrine in imposing its
duty of disclosure, the Muroc court placed considerable limitations on
its rule.16 This article builds on the reasoning of the Muroc court by
incorporating previous scholarship advocating the novel tort theory of
negligent employment referral' to propose an affirmative duty of
disclosure more comprehensive than that imposed in Muroc.
Section II of this article begins by surveying the evolution of tort
doctrine and the "no duty to act" rule. It then proceeds to examine
current theories of employer liability in the referral and hiring context
and moves on to trace the history of the negligent employment referral
claim. Next, this section scrutinizes the Muroc decision and ends with
a brief discussion of the future of negligent employment referral.
Section III begins by exploring the implications of nondisclosure
of reference information for both tort policy and tort doctrine. It then
13. Id. at 591.
14. See, e.g., J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 115, 116 (1998); Bradley Saxton, Employment References in California After Randi
W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District: A Proposal for Legislation to Promote Responsible
Employment Reference Practices, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 240 (1997) [hereinafter Saxton,
Employment References]; Anthony J. Sperber, When Nondisclosure Becomes Misrepresentation:
Shaping Employer Liability for Incomplete Job References, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 405 (1998).
15. See CA Supreme Court Says Employers Must Warn of Known Employment Risk, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT LITIG. REP., March 1997, at 9; Denlinger et al., Don't Stand So Close to Me:
Misleading Job References Can Lead to Liability, OHIO EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER 6 (1997);
Felhaber et al., References: Is It a No-Win Situation for Employers?, 7 MINN. EMPLOYMENT L.
LETTER 3 (1997); John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Issues and Trends in Employment
References and Defamation, N.Y.L.J., June 6, 1996, at 3; Steven P. Garmisa, Negligence References
Create Liability Despite Immunity Law, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Feb. 21, 1997, at 5; Rodney
H. Glover, Don't Say Anything at All, N.J.L.J., May 19, 1997, at 24; Holland & Hart LLP, The
Reference Dilemma, 2 MONT. EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER 3 (1997); Littler et al., Letters of
Recommendation: Silence is Golden, 6 CAL. EMPLOYMENT L. MONITOR 23 (1997); Perkins Coie,
Even a Positive Recommendation May Create Trouble for an Employer, 2 ALASKA EMPLOYMENT
L. LETTER 5 (1997); Richard J. Reibstein, Esq., Favorable Job Reference Claims: A New Cause
of Action, EMPLOYMENT LITIG. REP., March 25, 1997, at 22029; Allan H. Weitzman &
Kathleen McKenna, Employees' References May Spawn Litigation, NAT'L L. J., May 19, 1997, at
B4.
16. See Muroc, 929 P.2d at 590-91.
17. See, e.g., Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer
Liability, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1645 (1991); see also Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 7.
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proposes an affirmative duty of disclosure as a solution by amalgamat-
ing the reasoning of Muroc with that of Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California.i" This section concludes by illustrating how
such a duty comports with both tort policy and doctrine and by
assessing the effect of the proposed affirmative duty of disclosure on
current theories of employer liability in the referral and hiring context.
In Section IV, the article concludes that underlying policy
considerations and current tort doctrine justify imposing an affirmative
duty of disclosure on employers and that such a duty will benefit both
employers and potential victims of employee misconduct.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Evolution of Tort Doctrine and the "No Duty to Act" Rule
The early common law of tort originally operated under a system
very similar to modem strict liability. 9 Although the law recognized
the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, a defendant
remained liable for the consequences of his action whether or not he
was at fault.2"
The negligence theory emerged in the mid-nineteenth century and
coincided with the rise of industrialized production.2 Commentators
speculate that this concurrent development was less than coinciden-
tal.22 Rather, the commentators reason that the courts consciously,
or perhaps unconsciously, sought to limit the liability of infant industry
by shifting tort doctrine away from strict liability and toward the
negligence theory.23
The requirement of duty was, and remains, the hallmark of the
negligence theory.24 Under the negligence theory, the law requires an
existing duty on the defendant's part before he will face liability for his
harmful conduct. 2' The law and its commentators offer various
definitions of duty. However, one useful definition states that duty is
"an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to
18. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
19. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 356-57.
20. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972), reprinted in
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 14, 15 (Robert L. Rabin, ed., 3d ed. 1990).
21. Id. at 15-16; see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 357.
22. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 356-57; see also Posner, supra note 20, at 15.
23. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 356; see also Posner, supra note 20, at 15.
24. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 357.
25. Id.
[Vol. 22:265
Negligent Employment Referral
conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another."26  In
negligence cases, the duty remains the same at all times: the defendant
must engage in conduct that is reasonable under the circumstances.27
Duty in tort law thus dictates the defendant's conduct; it defines what
a defendant must do or refrain from doing to avoid liability.
28
Under the negligence theory, the law faults only those who cause
harm. 29  The notion of fault flows from duty and is bound up with
the idea of foreseeability. 30  Tort duty requires an actor to refrain
from engaging in conduct with harmful results. When an actor
foresees a harmful result, he must choose whether or not to avoid that
result.3 If the actor chooses to engage in the harmful conduct, then
the law will find fault and, in most cases, impose liability.32
Although the negligence theory prohibits actors from engaging in
harmful conduct, it consistently refuses to impose a general duty to act
for another's benefit.3 Commentators explain this distinction by
pointing to the concepts of misfeasance and nonfeasance that underlie
tort doctrine.34 By misfeasance, the law means active misconduct that
causes a positive injury to another.3 Misfeasance creates a risk of
injury.36  That risk, which did not exist before the defendant's
conduct, justifies holding the defendant liable for that conduct.37 By
nonfeasance, the law means passive inaction that may or may not result
in injury to another. 3' The nonfeasant actor, rather than creating a
risk of injury, merely fails to act to protect someone from injury.39
Essentially, nonfeasant conduct is conduct that fails to benefit
another.4" With certain exceptions, conduct that fails to work a
26. Id. at 356. Somewhat more cynically, Professor Prosser once stated bluntly that "[t]here
is a duty if the court says there is a duty." William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1953).
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 358-59.
28. Id.
29. Theodore M. Benditt, Liability for Failing to Rescue, in JUSTICE, RIGHTS, AND TORT
LAW 211, 211 (Michael D. Bayles and Bruce Chapman eds., 1983).
30. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, § 53.
31. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, THE COMMON LAW, LECTURE III, 77-80, 88-99, 107-10
(1881), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 2 (Robert L. Rabin, ed., 3d ed. 1990).
32. Id. at 9.
33. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 357.
34. Id. at 374.
35. Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J.
1272, 1273 (1949).
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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positive benefit, as opposed to conduct that works a positive injury,
does not justify a finding of liability.4' Rather, in most cases, the law
applies the "no duty to act" rule to insulate a defendant from liability
when his otherwise nonfeasant conduct results in harm to another.42
Courts occasionally recognize exceptions to the "no duty to act"
rule43 when a relationship exists between parties such that social
policy justifies imposing a duty to act.44 The courts will often find
a duty to act in at least three "relational" situations.
First, a special relation between a defendant and a third person
may impose a duty on the defendant to control the third person's
tortious conduct.45 Moreover, a special relation between a defendant
and a potential victim of a third person's tortious conduct may give the
victim a right of protection.46
Second, the courts may impose a duty to act where the plaintiff
occupies a vulnerable position as compared to a defendant who
possesses knowledge that the plaintiff does not, and, thus, who holds
considerable power over the plaintiffs welfare.47  The courts reason
that knowledge constitutes power over another who does not possess
the same knowledge or information. 4' By imposing a duty in those
41. McNiece & Thornton, supra note 35, at 1275.
42. See id.
43. Id.
44. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 374.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965). Section 315 cmt. a, states that
Section 315 "is a special application of the general rule stated in § 314." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 cmt. a (1965). Under Section 314 "[t]he fact that the actor realizes
or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314
(1965).
However, Section 314 cmt. c, states that: "[L]iability for non-feasance was slow to receive
any recognition in the law. It appeared first in, and is still largely confined to, situations in which
there was some special relation between the parties, on the basis of which the defendant was found
to have a duty to take action for the aid or protection of the plaintiff .... It appears inevitable
that, sooner or later such extreme cases of morally outrageous and indefensible conduct will arise
that there will be further inroads upon the older rule." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 314 cmt. c (1965).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a) (1965).
47. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 374.
48. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC POLICY 14 (1977). Con-
tract doctrine emphasizes the importance of parity of knowledge. Information disparity places one
of the bargaining parties in a position of superior bargaining power. Thus, disparity of
informational power in contractual relations allows the party with the superior information to act
opportunistically by taking advantage of the other party's information deficit. Similarly,
informational disparities in relationships recognized by tort doctrine as supporting a duty of care
confers power on the party who possesses information that could present harm to another. See
id. at 14-15 (discussing information disparity in the medical context).
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situations, the courts acknowledge the central role that power plays in
tort liability.49
Third, the courts may impose a duty to act where the defendant
enjoys an economic benefit from her interactions with the plaintiff.5 0
Such a duty embodies the benefit principle. The benefit principle
holds that the law should impose a duty on a defendant to act
affirmatively when the defendant receives a benefit from her interaction
with the plaintiff."1 Where the defendant reaps an economic benefit
from her interactions with the plaintiff, the duty, or the likelihood of
the court finding a duty, increases proportionately with the benefit.5
Beyond the duty to act imposed by relational situations, the law
recognizes other exceptions to the "no duty to act" rule. For example,
a court may impose a duty to act where the defendant's otherwise
innocent prior conduct created an unreasonable risk of harm to another
and where that conduct has already harmed the other. 3 The law may
also impose a duty to act where one gratuitously undertakes to act.54
In that case, the law holds that, if one undertakes to act, then one must
act with reasonable care or face liability for any harm caused. 5 The
law rationalizes this gratuitous act exception by reasoning that the
defendant who gratuitously undertakes to act voluntarily assumes a
duty.6 Once having assumed a duty, a defendant will face liability
if he or she fails to act with reasonable care. 7
B. Current Theories of Employer Liability in the
Referral and Hiring Contexts
Employers typically face liability for a wide range of tortious
conduct. However, the two potential causes of action relating most
directly to the subject of this article are defamation and negligent
hiring.
1. Defamatory References
Although defamation certainly is not a novel cause of action,
defamation claims arising in the employment reference context are
49. Id. at 4.
50. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 374.
51. McNiece & Thornton, supra note 35, at 1282-83.
52. Id.
53. KEETON ET AL., supra note 5, at 377.
54. McNiece & Thornton, supra note 35, at 1282.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
relatively recent phenomena."8 Defamation occurs in the employment
reference context when an employer makes a false or potentially
disparaging remark about a present or former employee in an employ-
ment reference.5 9
The law recognizes two defenses to a defamation claim. First,
truth is an absolute defense.6" Second, employers enjoy a qualified
privilege to defamation claims in the employment reference context. 61
The qualified privilege allows an employer to disclose potentially
defamatory information about an employee if he or she reasonably
believes that (1) the information affects an important interest of the
recipient or a third person, and (2) the law or generally accepted
standards of decent conduct require disclosure.62
Although employers enjoy a qualified privilege to defamation
claims, the privilege does not apply when he or she discloses the
defamatory information with malice.63  To show that an employer
acted maliciously, a plaintiff must prove that the employer (1) knew or
recklessly disregarded the falsity of the defamatory information,64 (2)
disclosed the information for an improper purpose,65 (3) excessively
disclosed the defamatory information,6 6 or (4) did not reasonably
believe that disclosure of the defamatory information would accomplish
an otherwise privileged purpose.67
The potential for defamation liability often affects the willingness
of employers to disclose reference information regarding current or
former employees. For instance, many employers are beginning to
adopt "no comment" policies in an effort to avoid defamation
claims. 6 Those employers who continue to respond to requests for
reference information often disclose only name, rank, and serial number
information regarding current and former employees.69 Ultimately,
58. See Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1647.
59. Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 7, at 71. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 558-559 (1965).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1965).
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 cmt. f (1965).
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1965).
63. Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 7, at 73.
64. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 600-602 (1965).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 603 (1965).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 604 (1965).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 605, 605A (1965).
68. Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their 'No
Comment' Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1381,
1385-88 (1996).
69. Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1645. Many excellent scholarly articles focus on the effects
of employers' unwillingness to disclose reference information. See, e.g., Valerie L. Acoff,
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the "no comment" policies and "bare bones" references drastically
reduce the amount of employee reference information available to
prospective employers. As a result, the quid pro quo for decreased
exposure to defamation liability often assumes the form of increased
exposure to liability for negligent hiring.
2. Negligent Hiring
The negligent hiring claim imposes on employers a duty to
exercise reasonable care in hiring their employees.7" Under the
doctrine of respondeat superior, the law traditionally held employers
liable for the unintentional torts of employees acting within the scope
of employment.7' However, the negligent hiring claim imposes
liability on an employer for all the acts of its employees, including
those beyond the scope of employment and those occurring after work
hours if the plaintiff proves that the employer acted negligently in
deciding to hire the employee."
The key issue in the negligent hiring claim revolves around the
employer's investigation of the prospective employee's background.73
Most courts hold that, to avoid liability for negligent hiring, an
employer must adequately investigate a prospective employee's
background to determine his or her fitness for the position.74 The
most useful information regarding a prospective employee's background
generally comes from his or her present or former employer.7" Thus,
a prospective employer can best avoid liability for negligent hiring by
receiving reference information from the prospective employee's present
or former employer.
The prospective employer's dependence on other employers for
reference information highlights the way in which one employer's
attempt to avoid defamation liability shifts the costs of his conduct
onto another: an employer's refusal to disclose full reference informa-
tion increases the potential negligent hiring liability of the employer
References Available Upon Request... Not! - Employers are Being Sued for Providing Employee Job
References, 17 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 755 (1994); Adler & Peirce, supra note 68; Daniloff, supra
note 8; Edward R. Horkan, Note, Contracting Around the Law of Defamation and Employment
References, 79 VA. L. REV. 517 (1993); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer
(Ir)Rationality and the Demise of Employment References, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 123 (1992); Saxton,
Flaws in the Laws, supra note 7.
70. Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1649.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1651.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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seeking the information. The theory of negligent employment referral
attempts to address exactly the issue of increased negligent hiring
liability resulting from underdisclosure of reference information.
C. The Emergence of the Negligent Employment Referral Theory
The negligent employment referral theory, while drawing on
existing tort doctrine, has not yet attained the status of doctrine itself.
Instead, the theory remains just that-an emerging and untested theory
that arose from the legal scholarship commenting on those cases with
facts ripe for its application.
While several reported cases reviewed facts ripe for a negligent
employment referral claim, no court has yet explicitly adopted the
theory. Rather, courts skirt the issue by applying traditional tort
doctrine, particularly the "no duty to act" rule and the provisions of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. This section gathers those cases
and reviews the legal scholarship commenting on them.
1. The Pre-Muroc Cases
The earliest published case with facts ripe for a negligent
employment referral claim appeared in 1985. In Gutzan v. Altair
Airlines, Inc.,76 defendant Joseph W. Farmer sought the help of
defendant Romac & Associates, an employment service, in securing a
position as a data programmer.77 Romac learned that Farmer had
been incarcerated during his military service when Farmer presented
a positive letter of reference from the United States Disciplinary
Barracks in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.78 Farmer explained to Romac
that his incarceration stemmed from charges of rape brought against
him by his German girlfriend while he was stationed in Germany but
assured Romac that his incarceration merely reflected "a policy of
military courts to appease foreign women who made such charges."79
A Romac employment counselor telephoned Fort Leavenworth to
verify the reference but did not inquire into the facts underlying
Farmer's conviction. 0
Romac subsequently recommended Farmer for a data processing
position with Altair."' Although Romac informed Altair of Farmer's
76. 766 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1985).
77. Id. at 137.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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military incarceration, Altair chose to hire him.82 Approximately one
year later, Farmer assaulted and raped the plaintiff, a coworker at
Altair.8" Soon after the rape, both Altair and Romac learned that
Farmer's military incarceration resulted from his conviction for
assaulting and raping a coworker.84
The plaintiff settled with Altair before trial.8" However, she
proceeded with her claim against Romac and received a jury verdict in
her favor.86 Romac then moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.87 The district court granted Romac's motion and denied the
plaintiffs subsequent motions for a new trial and to set aside the
judgment. 88
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the court should either (1)
grant her a new trial because the district court failed to give the jury
her requested instructions on sections 311 and 324A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts89 or (2) reverse the judgment because the
district court erred in granting Romac's post-trial motion."
82. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 137.
83. Id. at 138.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 138.
89. Id. Section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the
action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
Section 324A states:
One who undertakes . . . to render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the
third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person,
or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon
the undertaking.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324A (1965).
90. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 140.
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Because the appellate court found that the district court did not
err in failing to include the specific language of sections 311 and 324A
in the jury instructions, it did not reverse the district court's decision
denying the plaintiff a new trial.91 The court reasoned that the
instructions as a whole properly informed the jury of the concepts of
duty, negligence, and negligent omission.9 2
However, the court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.93 The court stated that, in granting the motion, the district
court concluded that Romac owed no duty to the plaintifft 4 and that
the duty to protect the plaintiff had shifted from Romac to Altair.95
The court relied on Section 452(2) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in finding that the duty did not shift to Altair. 6 Section 452(2)
states that
[w]here, because of lapse of time or otherwise, the duty to prevent
harm to another threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is found
to have shifted from the actor to a third person, the failure of the
third person to prevent such harm is a superseding cause."
The court reasoned that, under the circumstances of the case, "the
lapse of one year alone would not be sufficient for a finding that a duty
shifted to Altair."98 Altair's assumption that Farmer posed no danger
to fellow workers "rested on reassurances made by Romac... and the
passage of one year alone would not suffice to immunize the assump-
tion from challenge.""
The genesis of a theory of negligent employment referral arose
from the decision in Gutzan. The author of a 1987 article briefly
discussed Gutzan and concluded that plaintiffs who unsuccessfully seek
to hold employers liable under a negligent hiring theory may turn to
former employers in suits "for misrepresentation arising out of the
inaccurate references given to the current employer.""1 °  Although
the author did not explicitly posit a theory of negligent employment
referral, he implicitly recognized its potential.
91. Id. at 138.
92. Id. at 139-40.
93. Id. at 142.
94. Id. at 141.
95. Id.
96. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 141.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452(2) (1965).
98. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 141.
99. Id.
100. See Kyle E. Skopic, Potential Employer Liability for Employee References, 21 U. RICH.
L. REv. 427, 452 (1987).
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After Gutzan, the case law evolved fitfully while managing to
ignore a theory of negligent employment referral. In Cohen v.
Wales,'' for example, the plaintiffs raised claims remarkably similar
to those in Muroc. The complaint alleged that the codefendant
Warwick School District recommended a former teacher for a teaching
position with the Tri-Valley School District. °2 However, Warwick
failed to inform Tri-Valley that the teacher had been charged with
sexual misconduct while at Warwick. 3 Eleven years after Tri-
Valley hired the teacher, he "caused injury to the infant plaintiff.'
0 4
The plaintiffs sued for negligence but the trial court granted Warwick's
motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. 5  The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal.
In a three-paragraph opinion, the court held that Warwick had no
duty to warn Tri-Valley of the teacher's prior sexual misconduct
charges. 0 6 The court reasoned that "[t]he common law imposes no
duty to control the conduct of another or to warn those endangered by
such conduct, in the absence of a special relationship between either
the person who threatens harmful conduct or the foreseeable vic-
tim. "107
The court in Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc."°8 reached
a result similar to that in Cohen. In Moore, the decedent, a security
guard at a facility serviced by Maintenance Management Corporation,
was murdered by Allen St. Clair, a fellow employee. 9 St. Clair
worked for defendant St. Joseph Nursing Home prior to his employ-
ment by Maintenance Management.1" °  While employed by St.
Joseph, St. Clair received twenty-four disciplinary warnings for
misconduct ranging from alcohol and drug abuse to outright vio-
lence."' In its defense, St. Joseph asserted that Maintenance Man-
agement never contacted it to obtain reference information regarding
St. Clair." 2  However, St. Joseph admitted that it would have
provided only St. Clair's dates of employment had Maintenance
101. 518 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 634.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Cohen, 518 N.Y.S. at 634.
108. 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
109. Id. at 101.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 102.
112. Id.
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Management requested information."3 The plaintiffs claimed that
St. Joseph had a duty as a matter of law voluntarily to disclose St.
Clair's history of misconduct to Maintenance Management.114
The court held that St. Joseph had no duty to disclose and
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment of dismissal.11 The
court stated that a defendant owes no duty to protect one endangered
by a third party's conduct unless a special relationship existed between
either the defendant and the endangered party or the defendant and the
dangerous third party.'16 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
St. Joseph and Maintenance Management enjoyed a special relationship"arising from a moral and social duty which [the] law recognizes as
existing between an individual's former and prospective employ-
ers. "117 Although moral and social obligations might compel the
former employer to disclose such information, the court reasoned that
the law imposes no similar obligation."'
Finally, the trial court in the recent, unreported case of Jerner v.
Allstate Ins. Co." 9 implicitly approved a negligent employment
referral claim. In Jerner, Fireman's Fund Insurance Companies hired
Paul Calden after he left a low-level management job at Allstate
following his violation of the company's policy against carrying a
handgun to work. 2 ° After his discharge from Fireman's Fund,
Calden shot and killed three and wounded two Fireman's Fund
employees. 2' The plaintiffs alleged that Allstate recommended
Calden to Fireman's Fund out of fear of retaliation for a negative
reference. 122
After filing the action, the plaintiffs moved to amend their
complaint to seek punitive damages against Allstate. 23  The trial
113. Id.
114. Moore, 459 N.W.2d at 102.
115. Id. at 103.
116. Id. at 102.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Jerner v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at D7 (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Aug. 18, 1995).
120. See Workplace Violence: Allstate Settles Lawsuit Connected to 1993 Shooting Deaths,
1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 193, at D17 (Oct. 5, 1995).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Workplace Violence: Judge Allows Plaintiffs to Seek Damages Over Recommendation
of Violent Employee, 1995 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at D7 (Aug. 18, 1995).
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judge granted the plaintiffs' motion124 and Allstate settled with the
plaintiffs less than two months later. 125
Despite the varied results of the pre-Muroc cases, the courts in
each case refused to look beyond hornbook tort doctrine in resolving
the issues before them. Although the court in Gutzan granted the
plaintiff the relief that she sought, it premised its decision on the
traditional doctrine of shifting duty. Both the Cohen and Moore courts
premised their holdings on the traditional "no duty to act" rule.
Despite the intriguing possibilities of Jerner, the court's reasons for
granting the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint must remain
nothing more than an intriguing possibility, as the parties settled and
the case was unreported.
Although plaintiffs faced with facts such as those in the above
cases sometimes prevail under traditional tort doctrine, the cases
illustrate the necessity of a doctrine that can bring order to this corner
of the law. The theory of negligent employment referral attempts to
provide that order while also providing plaintiffs a remedy. In doing
so, the theory encourages courts to look beyond mere hornbook tort
doctrine and toward both evolving case law and the policy underlying
it.
2. Negligent Employment Referral and the Tarasoff Rationale
Janet Swerdlow offered the first express enunciation of a negligent
employment referral theory in a 1991 article. 126 Swerdlow based her
theory on the California Supreme Court's reasoning in Tarasoff v.
Regents of the University of California.127
In Tarasoff, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant psychothera-
pist's patient, Prosenjit Poddar, confided to the psychotherapist his
intent to kill the plaintiffs' daughter, Tatiana Tarasoff.128 The police
briefly detained Poddar at the psychotherapist's request. 129 However,
they released Poddar once he appeared rational,13° and the psycho-
therapist's superior advised the police to take no further action to
124. Id.
125. See Workplace Violence: Allstate Settles Lawsuit Connected to 1993 Shooting Deaths,
supra note 120 at D17.
126. See Swerdlow, supra note 17.
127. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); see Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1659.
128. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 339-40.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
detain him.131 No one warned Tarasoff or her family of Poddar's
threats.132 Poddar subsequently killed Tarasoff.133
The Tarasoff court held that the plaintiffs could amend their
complaint to state a claim against the defendant psychotherapist and
his employer for breach of a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect
Tatiana.134 In doing so, the court imposed a novel duty on a psycho-
therapist to warn third persons who face imminent physical danger
from one of the psychotherapist's patients. 35 The court acknowl-
edged that no independent relationship existed between the psychother-
apist and Tatiana. 36  However, the court found that a special
relationship existed between the psychotherapist and Poddar. 37 The
special nature of that relationship, the court reasoned, supported an
affirmative duty to act for the benefit of a third person like Tatiana
Tarasoff138
The Tarasoff court set out a three-part test which, if satisfied,
imposes on a defendant a duty to warn third parties of potential
danger. First, the court cited to Section 315 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in holding that a special relationship must exist
between the defendant and either (1) the potentially dangerous person
or (2) the third-party potential victim.139 The court reasoned that,
although no relationship existed between Tarasoff and the defendant
therapist, a special relationship existed between Poddar and his
therapist sufficient to support a finding of duty.14 °
131. Id. at 340.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 339.
134. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 348.
135. See id. at 347-48.
136. Id. at 343.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. See also Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1660. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 315 (1965). Section 315 cmt. a, states that Section 315 "is a special application of the general
rule stated in § 314." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 cmt. a (1965). Under Section
314, "[tlhe fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is necessary for
another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). However, Section 314 cmt. c, states that:
"[L]iability for non-feasance was slow to receive any recognition in the law. It appeared first in,
and is still largely confined to, situations in which there was some special relation between the
parties, on the basis of which the defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid
or protection of the plaintiff .... It appears inevitable that, sooner or later such extreme cases
of morally outrageous and indefensible conduct will arise that there will be further inroads upon
the older rule." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965). It seems that the
Tarasoff court took full advantage of the final sentence of cmt. c in imposing a duty on the
defendant psychotherapist.
140. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345-46.
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Second, the court stated that the risk of harm to the victim must
be foreseeable."' Foreseeability, according to the court, becomes the
most important consideration when examining the existence of
duty.142  However, despite foreseeability's importance, the court
essentially merged the element of foreseeability into its analysis of the
defendant psychotherapist's relationship to his patient. The court
stated that
when the avoidance of foreseeable harm requires a defendant to
control the conduct of another person, or to warn of such conduct,
the common law has traditionally imposed liability only if the
defendant bears some special relationship to the dangerous person
or to the potential victim. Since the relationship between a therapist
and his patient satisfies this requirement, we need not here decide
whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another's con-
duct.1 43
Thus, although the court included foreseeability in its duty calculus,
it became a nonissue under the facts in Tarasoff. The plaintiffs'
complaint alleged that Poddar explicitly told his psychotherapist that
he intended to kill Tarasoff'44 and the record showed that the
psychotherapist informed the police of Poddar's threat.14  The
defendants clearly foresaw the threat to Tarasoff. Given established
foreseeability of harm, the Tarasoff court focused principally on the
special psychotherapist-patient relationship.
Professor Peter Lake suggests that the California Supreme Court's
focus on the special relationship requirement, or what he calls the"special relationship caveat," allowed it to "unhook" the foreseeability
requirement from its more or less narrow holding. 146  Lake focuses
on the Tarasoff court's statement that, "[s]ince the relationship between
a therapist and his patient satisfies this requirement, we need not here
decide whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect a potential victim of another's
conduct."' 47 According to Lake, "[t]his sentence serves to fortify an
141. Id. at 342-43. See also Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1660.
142. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342.
143. Id. at 342-43.
144. Id. at 341.
145. Id.
146. Peter F. Lake, Revisiting Tarasoff, 58 ALB. L. REV. 97, 122-23 (1994). The narrow
holding here is that a defendant psychotherapist has a duty to warn third persons of threats by
a potentially dangerous patient.
147. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
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interpretation that the case rests on a doctrinal acceptance of 'special
relationship' rules."' 48  Tarasoff, Lake states, implies that, "because
the special relationship rules permit liability based on a duty of
reasonable care," foreseeability is of secondary importance.'49 The
court's discussion of foreseeability, then, becomes "mere dicta" and is
subsumed by the special relationship requirement.'
As the third element of its test, the Tarasoff court stated that the
potential victim must be identifiable.'' However, the court refused
to define "identifiable" and urged, instead, a contextual approach:
"[tihe matter [of identifiability] is one which depends upon the
circumstances of each case, and should not be governed by any hard and
fast rule."' 2
By more or less brushing aside its identifiability requirement, the
California Supreme Court offered little guidance to subsequent courts
faced with the issue of victim identifiability when applying the three-
part Tarasoff test. However, the same court shed some light on the
Tarasoff identifiability requirement when it decided Thompson v.
County of Alameda"5 3 four years after Tarasoff. Applying the Tara-
soff identifiability factor, the Thompson court stated that a defendant
has no duty to warn of possible harm when the plaintiff "was not a
known identifiable victim, but rather a member of a large amorphous
public group of potential targets. ' 154
Although the Thompson holding appears facially to undermine
Tarasoff, the holding cannot be separated from the facts of the case.
In Thompson, the County of Alameda (County) released a juvenile
offender into his mother's custody despite the fact that he told County
workers that he intended to kill an unnamed child who lived near-
by.' The County did not warn the police, the juvenile offender's
mother, or the parents in the offender's neighborhood of the offender's
threat. 6 Within 24 hours of his release, the juvenile offender killed
the plaintiffs' son.' 7
148. Lake, supra note 146, at 122.
149. Id. at 124.
150. Id. at 125.
151. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345 n.1l.
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980).
154. Id. at 738.
155. Id. at 730.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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In analyzing the County's duty to warn, the court weighed both
policy considerations and "'foreseeability' within the context of this
case."1 8 As the court made clear, its foreseeability and identifiability
analyses were context-driven. In fact, the analysis turned almost
exclusively on the logistical problems of imposing a duty to warn on
governmental entities that release potentially dangerous persons into
the community. First, the court reasoned that the sheer volume of
parolees released each year prohibited state and local governments from
notifying the general public of each potentially dangerous person."'
The court then distinguished Tarasoff by stating that a warning given
directly to an isolated individual such as Tatiana Tarasoff would have
a greater effect than a general warning given to a broad segment of the
population.16° Next, the court reasoned that warning the police of a
potentially dangerous offender would serve little purpose unless the
police subsequently went door to door warning each resident in the
juvenile offender's neighborhood.' Finally, the court reasoned that
requiring the County to give public notice of the presence of a
potentially dangerous person would undermine the government's efforts
to rehabilitate offenders.'62
The facts in Thompson, as the court itself recognized, differed
greatly from those in Tarasoff. While the victims in Thompson were
arguably "identifiable" in the broad sense of the term, under the
court's reasoning, any attempt to warn those victims required too much
effort in return for too little protection. In the end, the Thompson
court employed the term "identifiable victim" exactly as the Tarasoff
court intended: contextually.
The court's refusal in Tarasoff to define its identifiability
requirement left room for it and future courts to make highly
contextual decisions, as illustrated by Thompson. Moreover, while the
Tarasoff court set out what it claimed was a three-part test for courts
to use in analyzing a defendant's duty to warn, the court focused
primarily on the special relationship requirement.'63 As Professor
Lake suggests, the court "unhooked" the foreseeability requirement
from its specific holding for the exact reason that it wished to focus on
special relationship rules.' 64
158. Id. at 734 (emphasis added).
159. Thompson, 614 P.2d at 736.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 737.
163. Id. at 733.
164. Lake, supra note 146, at 123.
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In her article advocating the tort of negligent employment referral,
Swerdlow adopted the Tarasoff special relationship rationale. She
reasoned that a special relationship much like that between a psycho-
therapist and a patient exists between an employer and a current or
former employee. 165 Given that relationship, Swerdlow argued, the
law should impose an affirmative duty of disclosure on employers who
possess information that would make it reasonably foreseeable that an
employee or former employee poses a risk of harm to a third per-
son. 166
Since Swerdlow's article, a second commentator followed her lead
in arguing that the Tarasoff rationale could support an affirmative duty
of disclosure. 67 However, others argue that Tarasoff cannot support
such a duty.168  For example, Professors Adler and Peirce reason in
their article that the severance of the master-servant relationship
terminates any special relationship between an employer and an
employee. 69  Moreover, Adler and Peirce point out that courts,
although willing to extend the Tarasoff rationale to other contexts, have
not yet extended it to the employment reference context. 170 Instead,
Adler and Peirce believe that, if courts adopt the Tarasoff rationale in
the employment reference context, it will be limited to especially
compelling cases."1
Despite the theory's detractors, Swerdlow's original argument
postulated that a theory of negligent employment referral represents a
natural extension of Tarasoff. According to Swerdlow, negligent
employment referral presents a viable doctrinal alternative to courts
faced with a plaintiffs claim that she suffered injury at the hands of a
former employee negligently referred by a former employer.1 72  The
California Supreme Court faced exactly that situation in Randi W v.
Muroc Joint Unified School District.173
165. Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1660-63.
166. Id. Although Swerdlow analogizes the relationship between an employer and a current
or former employee to that between a psychotherapist and patient, she does not discuss the
analogy at length.
167. See Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra note 7, at 91.
168. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 68.
169. Id. at 1440.
170. Id. at 1442-43.
171. Id. at 1443-44.
172. Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1672-73.
173. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
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D. Randi W v. Muroc Joint Unified School District
In Muroc, codefendant Robert Gadams worked for three Califor-
nia school districts before his employment with defendant Livingston
Union School District.'74 The plaintiff alleged that each of the
school districts provided positive letters of recommendation regarding
Gadams to the placement office of Fresno Pacific College.'75 The
defendants made the recommendations on forms provided by Fresno
Pacific, which clearly stated that the information provided would "'be
sent to prospective employers."" 76  Fresno Pacific subsequently
released the recommendations to Livingston Union School District.'77
The plaintiff alleged that the school districts failed to disclose in their
recommendations to Fresno Pacific that Gadams had a verifiable
history of sexual misconduct during his employment with all three
districts. 8 The plaintiff further alleged that Gadams, while em-
ployed by Livingston, "'negligently and offensively touched, molested,
and engaged in sexual touching of [the] 13-year old [plaintiff]
proximately causing injury to her."""
The plaintiffs complaint raised six claims, including negligent
misrepresentation and fraud.' ° The trial court dismissed the com-
plaint with prejudice on the defendants' demurrer.' 8 ' The Court of
Appeal reversed as to the negligent misrepresentation and fraud
claims. 2
The California Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal and
allowed the negligent misrepresentation and fraud claims to pro-
ceed.'8 3  The court noted that, absent some special relationship
between the parties or a specific threat of harm, defendants such as the
school districts traditionally owed no duty to the plaintiff. 4 The
plaintiff alleged no special relationship, but argued, as did the plaintiff
in Gutzan, that Section 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
allowed recovery in this situation.' The court accepted the plain-
174. Id. at 585.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 585.
180. Id. at 585-86.
181. Id. at 586.
182. Id. at 586-87.
183. Id. at 595.
184. Id. at 588.
185. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 588.
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tiffs argument under Section 311 and then went beyond the plaintiff s
argument to incorporate Section 310 of the Restatement into its
reasoning.
Section 310 of the Restatement states:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to
another for physical harm which results from an act done by the
other or a third person in reliance upon the truth of the representa-
tion, if the actor
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is
likely to induce action by the other, or a third person,
which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
the other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he profess-
es. 186
Section 311 of the Restatement states:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is
subject to liability for physical harm caused by action taken by
the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where
such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put
in peril by the action taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable
care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.1 87
While ultimately accepting and expanding the plaintiff's argument
under the Restatement, the Muroc court made other notable findings.
First, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs claims presented an
issue of first impression.'88 As such, it undertook an analysis to
determine whether the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty not to
misrepresent Gadams's qualifications or character in their letters of
recommendation. 189  In its analysis, the court found, among other
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 310 (1965).
187. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1965).
188. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 588.
189. Id. at 586-87.
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things, that the defendants could have foreseen the injury to the
plaintiff and that, on the facts alleged in the complaint, the defendants'
conduct proximately caused the plaintiffs injury.'9  The court also
found that the defendants could have engaged in alternative courses of
conduct to avert the plaintiffs injury and that imposing a duty of care
on the defendant employers would not run counter to public policy
considerations.' 9 The court reasoned that its initial findings war-
ranted imposing a duty on the defendants not to engage in misrepre-
sentations.1 92
Second, the court found that the defendants' letters of recommen-
dation constituted affirmative, misleading misrepresentations rather
than mere nondisclosure for purposes of Sections 310 and 311.193
The court stated that the defendants' unqualified recommendations for
Gadams "were false and misleading in light of defendants' alleged
knowledge of charges of Gadams's repeated sexual improprieties."' 94
The court thus concluded that the plaintiffs allegation of misleading
half-truths warranted an exception to the general rule precluding
liability for mere nondisclosure or failure to act.
Third, the court concluded that the plaintiff need not plead her
own reliance on the defendants' misrepresentations.'95 The court
190. Id. at 588.
191. Id. at 589-91. The court stated that "[a]s for public policy, the law certainly recognizes
a policy of preventing future harm of the kind alleged here." Id. at 589. The court continued
by stating that "'[w]hen deciding whether to expand a tort duty of care, courts must consider the
potential social and economic consequences."' Id. at 590 (quoting Macias v. California, 897 P.2d
530 (1995)).
In considering the potential social and economic consequences, the court rejected the
defendants' arguments that imposing tort liability on writers of recommendation letters would
result in fewer employers writing such letters and that disclosure of more than minimal
employment information would result in increased exposure to liability for defamation, breach of
privacy, or wrongful interference with employment. Id. at 590. While the court did not clearly
state the reasons for its conclusion, it discussed at some length California Civil Code, Section 47,
subdivision (c). Id. That section grants employers a "qualified privilege for nonmalicious
communications regarding ajob applicant's qualification." Id. Under Section 47, subdivision (c),
the qualified privilege "applies to and includes a communication concerning the job performance
or qualifications of an applicant for employment, based upon credible evidence, made without
malice, by a current or former employer of the applicant to, and upon request of, the prospective
employer." Id. at 590-91. Despite its discussion of Section 47, subdivision (c), the court stated
that the provision did not apply in this case because the defendants did not disclose Gadams's
reference information on Livingston's request. Id. at 591.
California Civil Code, Section 47, subdivision (c), parallels in many respects Washington's
proposed Senate Bill 6699. See infra, note 206.
192. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 591.
193. Id. at 592.
194. Id. at 593.
195. Id. at 594.
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reasoned that, as this case involved fraudulent letters of recommenda-
tion, the plaintiff likely could not personally rely on the misrepresenta-
tions. 19 In such a case, the court stated, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts contemplated only that the recipient of the misrepresentations
need rely on them and that the plaintiff need only allege that her injury
resulted from the recipient's reliance. 197
Finally, the court concluded that the defendants' misrepresenta-
tions proximately caused the plaintiffs injury. 98
Because the court concluded that the defendants' conduct violated
Sections 310 and 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, it found
that the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs complaint and
remanded the matter for further proceedings.19 9
Although the Muroc court ultimately imposed a duty of disclosure
on employers, it did not make that duty absolute. In reaching its
conclusion, the court stated that
the writer of a letter of recommendation owes to third persons a
duty not to misrepresent the facts in describing the qualifications
and character of a former employee, if making those misrepresenta-
tions would present a substantial, foreseeable risk of physical injury
to the third persons. In the absence, however, of resulting physical
injury, or some special relationship between the parties, the writer
of a letter of recommendation should have no duty of care extending
to third persons for misrepresentations made concerning former
employees. In those cases, the policy favoring free and open
communication with prospective employers should prevail."'
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 594. The court resolved the issue of proximate cause in one
paragraph. The court stated that "[d]efendants do not suggest that the complaint fails to state
sufficient facts to establish proximate causation, assuming the remaining elements [under Sections
310 and 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts] of duty, misrepresentation and reliance are
sufficiently pleaded." Id. The court then concluded that "[b]ased on the facts alleged in the
complaint, plaintiffs injury foreseeably and proximately resulted from Livingston's decision to
hire Gadams in reliance on defendants' unqualified recommendation of him." Id.
Because the defendants, in Muroc, conceded the issue of proximate cause, the court avoided
some potentially difficult causation issues. For example, had the defendants contested causation,
they possibly could have argued that Livingston's decision to hire Gadams constituted, if not a
superseding cause relieving them of liability, then at least comparative faut on the part of
Livingston. However, the court expended the bulk of its energy in addressing the issue of duty.
This Comment does the same and leaves the issue of proximate cause in negligent employment
referral cases for future commentary and future trial judges and juries. Perhaps it is enough to
recognize that the parties to any negligent employment referral case will in all likelihood hotly
contest the issue of causation. Of course, litigation of causation presupposes a duty, which this
Comment argues exists.
199. Id. at 595.
200. Id. at 591.
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The rule announced in Muroc steps away from the presumptive"no duty to act" rule that traditionally guided employer reference
practices. Yet, viewed contextually, the Muroc rule functions only in
narrow situations. The rule seems to apply only when (1) the
employer foresees that a present or former employee presents a
substantial risk of physical injury to third persons, (2) despite the
foreseeable risk, the employer writes a letter of recommendation or
provides a reference, and (3) either physical injury to a third person
actually results or a special relationship exists between the parties. In
Muroc, Gadams caused physical injury to the plaintiff, thus triggering
the physical injury exception. As the plaintiff did not allege the
existence of a special relationship, the court had no occasion to examine
the relationship between the defendants and either Gadams or the
plaintiff.
The Muroc court further narrowed its holding by offering
employers the chance to opt out of the limited duty that its rule
imposes. The majority wrote that
defendants had alternative courses of conduct to avoid tort liability,
namely, (1) writing a "full disclosure" letter revealing all relevant
facts regarding Gadams's background, or (2) writing a "no com-
ment" letter omitting any affirmative representations regarding
Gadams's qualifications, or merely verifying basic employment dates
and details. The parties cite no case or Restatement provision
suggesting that a former employer has an affirmative duty of
disclosure that would preclude such a no comment letter. As we
have previously indicated, liability may not be imposed for mere
nondisclosure or other failure to act, at least in the absence of some
special relationship not alleged here.2"'
The problem with the Muroc opt-out provision becomes obvious
on close scrutiny. The opt-out provision allows employers the choice
between (1) writing a full disclosure letter, (2) writing only a "name,
rank, and serial number" letter, or, presumably, (3) remaining silent
altogether. Given those options, any reasonable, risk-averse employer
will choose either the second or third option. Choosing to write a full
disclosure letter would result in an increase in the employer's exposure
to defamation liability.
Despite the shortcomings of the Muroc rule and its opt-out
provision, the court planted a diamond in the terrain of its reasoning.
It hinted in the language of the opt-out provision that it might impose
201. Id. at 589 (emphasis in original).
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an affirmative duty of disclosure on employers who possess valuable
reference information. The court stated that "liability may not be
imposed for mere nondisclosure or other failure to act, at least in the
absence of some special relationship not alleged here. ' 2 2 The italicized
language implies that, if a complaint alleges a special relationship
among plaintiff, defendant employer, or tortious employee, then a court
could impose liability "for mere nondisclosure or other failure to
act. '2 3  Thus, with that language, the Muroc court unlocked the
door to liability based on a "duty to act."
E. The Future of Negligent Employment Referral
The future of negligent employment referral remains unclear. To
date, no court has relied on either the Muroc rule or the broader theory
of negligent employer referral as authority for finding a duty to disclose
in the employment referral context.0 4 Moreover, both the Muroc
and Gutzan courts relied on arguably strained interpretations of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in finding a duty of disclosure. Neither
court appeared willing to fashion a more expansive rule that would
embrace the negligent employment referral theory.
However, courts in California and across the country will likely
continue to face similar claims in the future.2"' Perhaps even more
importantly, states such as Washington are attempting to address
through legislation the issues arising out of cases like Muroc.2"6
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 589.
204. See, e.g., California Service Station and Auto. Repair Ass'n v. Am. Home Assurance
Co., No. A074157, 1998 WL 151466, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 1998) (holding the Muroc
duty to disclose inapplicable to insurance contract negotiations); see also Neptuno Treuhand-und
Verwaltungsgesellschaft MBH v. Arbor, 692 N.E.2d 812, 819 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (refusing to
follow Muroc and other "negligent referral" cases in finding no liability for a nonemployer
defendant's referral of a prospective employee who later caused the employer over $5 million in
economic damages).
205. California courts will surely face similar claims because Muroc opened a new door on
employer liability in that state. Other jurisdictions will likely face similar claims because of the
effect that developments in California tort law traditionally have on national trends in tort
litigation. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
206. See, e.g., S.B. 6699, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1998). The Washington legislature
intended to create in Senate Bill 6699 a partial liability shield to an employer sued by a former
employee for allegedly disclosing defamatory reference information. Under Senate Bill 6699
an employer is presumed to be acting in good faith and is immune from civil liability
to an employee for disclosing information to a prospective employer, as long as the
information relates to ability to do the job; diligence, skill, or reliability; and illegal or
wrongful acts. To rebut the presumption requires clear and convincing evidence that
the disclosure was knowingly false or deliberately misleading.
Negligent Employment Referral
Because of the increased likelihood of claims similar to those in Muroc,
the bar and the courts should reexamine the question of negligent
employment referral. A proactive stance will help to avoid strained
readings of existing law and the ad hoc jurisprudence of courts past.
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Implications of Underdisclosure
The underdisclosure of reference information holds implications
for tort law on both policy and doctrinal levels.2" 7
On the policy level, underdisclosure first implicates the basic
principles of fault and foreseeability. The problem assumes an almost
syllogistic form. The "no duty to act" rule imposes on employers no
duty to act affirmatively for the benefit of another; even if harm
results, an employer's failure to act is traditionally characterized as
nonfeasant and carries with it no liability. An employer who fails to
disclose reference information that could prevent foreseeable harm to
a third person engages in conduct that results in harm. However, the"no duty to act" rule characterizes the employer's conduct as nonfea-
sant and refuses to impose liability for the harm caused. Absent the
traditional "no duty to act" rule, the employer's choice to engage in
that harmful conduct would lead to imposition of fault. Liability
would then follow if foreseeable harm resulted. Thus, the question
Although Senate Bill 6699 passed both houses of the Washington State Legislature, Governor
Gary Locke vetoed the bill on April 1, 1998. Veto Message on S.B. 6699, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 1998). In his veto message, Governor Locke stated that he
strongly agreed with the intent of this legislation . . . . It is clear that the laws applying
to employee references need to be reformed. In recent years, employers have been
reluctant to provide job reference information regarding former employees, for fear of
liability. The consequence is that employers often cannot get adequate information to
make good hiring decisions. This can be a big problem in the case of workplace
violence or theft. . . . However, SB 6699 is not crafted finely enough to properly solve
these problems .... Among other concerns, SB 6699 conflicts with the state's anti-
blacklisting statue (RCW 49.44.010) and would effectively take away any civil remedy
an employee could seek if blacklisted.
Id. Governor Locke urged interested parties to work with one another to draft legislation that"satisfies employers' need for freer flow of information, while maintaining meaningful protection
for employees." Id.
Although the Washington State Legislature attempted to resolve one of the key issues
addressed by the theory of negligent employment referral by proposing SB 6699, no reported
Washington case has raised issues ripe for application of the negligent employment referral theory.
207. As Judge Dean Morgan of the Washington Court of Appeals, Division II, likes to
remind his Evidence students, law itself is nothing more than social policy. Thus, the division
of this section into separate discussions of "policy" and "doctrine" recognizes a distinction that,
perhaps, does not exist. However, the author chooses to make that distinction for purposes of
clarity and ease of discussion.
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becomes whether the employer's choice to engage in harmful conduct
warrants departure from the "no duty to act" rule and the imposition
of liability.
Second, underdisclosure implicates the relational principle of tort
policy. An employer who withholds reference information that could
avert possible harm to others holds power over the welfare of a
potential victim who does not possess that same information. By
withholding that information, the employer increases the possibility of
harm to the victim. Disclosure decreases the possibility of harm.
Thus, the question once again becomes whether the relationship of
disparate power justifies imposing a duty of disclosure.
Finally, the relationship among employers within the employment
community implicates the benefit principle of tort policy. By seeking
reference information about prospective employees, employers access
an informal but reciprocal reference system.2"8 By accessing the
reference system, employers receive a substantial benefit: the
information that they receive helps them to hire the most competent
employees, thereby limiting their exposure to liability for negligent
hiring. As with the previous policy considerations, the law must
decide whether the benefit that employers receive by accessing the
reference system warrants imposing on them an affirmative duty of
disclosure.
On the doctrinal level, underdisclosure most immediately
implicates negligent hiring and defamation claims. To avoid liability
for negligent hiring, prospective employers must adequately and
reasonably investigate a prospective employee's background.2"9 As
plaintiffs increasingly bring and prevail on defamation claims in the
employment context, employers have become increasingly wary of
disclosing reference information that could lead to defamation
suits."' The more wary of disclosure that employers become, the
less reference information they will provide to prospective employers.
The decrease in available reference information also holds obvious
significance for employers defending against negligent hiring claims.
Employers who cannot obtain full reference information on prospective
employees cannot conduct adequate and reasonable background
investigations.2 ' Failure to investigate adequately leads to increased
negligent hiring liability.
208. See Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1661 (theorizing that prospective employers depend
on former employers for valuable reference information).
209. See id. at 1651.
210. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 68, at 1385.
211. See Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1651.
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While the Muroc court stepped away from the "no duty to act"
rule, its opt-out provision encourages employers to withhold valuable
reference information. In its opt-out provision, the Muroc court
essentially told employers that they need not write a full disclosure
letter. Instead, the court told employers that they could choose to
write either a "name, rank, and serial number" letter, or, presumably,
no letter at all. As such, Muroc does little to solve the problem of
underdisclosure. Faced with the choices in the Muroc court's opt-out
provision, any reasonable employer will likely choose to provide only
bare bones reference information if they provide any information at all.
Muroc neither offers injured plaintiffs the full remedy that they
need nor adequately addresses the mounting pressure between the
doctrines of negligent hiring and defamation. Instead, Muroc will allow
former employers to continue passing the liability buck to those who
hire potentially dangerous employees while injured plaintiffs pay the
physical price.
B. The Solution
The law needs an escape valve to release the mounting pressure
between the doctrines of negligent hiring and defamation while
providing a remedy for plaintiffs like Randi W. Such a device must
respond to both tort policy and doctrine without inordinately increasing
employers' exposure to liability.
The negligent employment referral theory can release that pressure
with minimal impact on employer liability212 by imposing on em-
ployers an affirmative duty of disclosure. Moreover, the theory will
respond to both tort policy and doctrine. First, the theory will give
effect to the fault and foreseeability principle and the relational
principle of tort policy. Second, the theory will comport with the
Tarasoff rationale while reconciling the conflict between the doctrines
of negligent hiring and defamation.
However, the duty of disclosure must be limited. First, an
employer should provide full reference information to prospective
employers or intermediaries,213 but only if that information would
make it reasonably foreseeable that an employee or former employee
poses a risk of physical harm214 to a prospective employer or a third
212. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.
213. An intermediary may be an employment service, as in Gutzan, a school placement
office, as in Muroc, or any other similar entity.
214. Of course, a former employee could foreseeably cause economic harm to his or her
employer or psychological harm or emotional distress to his or her victim by threatening, stalking,
and the like. However, the physical harm limitation attempts to draw a bright line only beyond
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
person. Second, the duty would require disclosure only on request by
a prospective employer. 215 Finally, the duty would require disclosure
only where the employer possesses verifiable information regarding the
misconduct of a present or former employee.216  Tempered by
reasonable limitations, the negligent employment referral theory will
release the mounting pressure between the doctrines of negligent hiring
and defamation and provide a remedy to innocent victims of a former
employee's misconduct, all with minimal impact on employer liability.
1. The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure and Tort Policy
By imposing on employers a duty to disclose information that
would make it reasonably foreseeable that an employee or former
employee poses a risk of harm to a potential victim, the negligent
employment referral theory will give effect to both the fault and
foreseeability principle and the relational principle of tort policy.
a. Fault and Foreseeability
An affirmative duty of disclosure will comport with the tort
principle of fault and foreseeability. If an employer knows with
reasonable certainty that an employee is dangerous or violent, then the
employer knows that the employee will likely present a continuing risk
of harm to others. An employer who chooses to withhold such
information chooses to engage in conduct that ultimately results in
harm to innocent victims. The choice to withhold reference informa-
tion that could prevent foreseeable harm places an employer within the
realm of legal fault. Because an employer's disclosure of reference
information could prevent foreseeable harm to a prospective employer
or a third person, failure to do so warrants departure from the "no
duty to act" rule.
For example, the actions of the defendant school districts in Muroc
implicated the principle of fault and foreseeability. Because Gadams
had a verifiable history of sexual misconduct with female students
which the law will impose liability on a former employer for negligently referring a former
employee.
215. The "on request" proviso represents a commonsensical limitation: the law should not
impose on employers an open-ended duty to warn anyone and everyone that an employee or
former employee poses a risk of physical harm. Rather, the law should impose on employers a
duty to warn only where the employee's past conduct creates a foreseeable risk of harm to
identifiable victims or class of victims. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West 1998) (limiting
liability for employers who disclose reference information to prospective employers, but only when
disclosed on the prospective employer's request).
216. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.
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during his employment with each of the three recommending school
districts, each district knew that he likely presented a continuing risk
of harm to other female students. By choosing to withhold information
regarding Gadams's history of sexual misconduct, the recommending
school districts engaged in conduct that ultimately resulted in harm to
the plaintiff, a female student. The choice to withhold that informa-
tion placed the school districts within the traditional realm of legal
fault. Because disclosure of that information could have prevented
foreseeable harm to the plaintiff, the failure of the school districts to do
so warranted departure from the "no duty to act" rule.
b. The Relational Principle of Tort Policy
An affirmative duty of disclosure will also give effect to the
relational principle of tort policy. First, the relationship of disparate
power between an employer and a former employee's potential victims
justifies imposing an affirmative duty to warn. The employer who
possesses reference information that could prevent foreseeable harm
holds power over potential victims because the employer knows what
the victim does not: that a former employee poses a risk of harm.
Disclosing that information to prospective employers will avert harm
to potential victims, while withholding that information exponentially
increases the risk of harm. Because of the relationship of disparate
power between former employers and potential victims, the law should
impose on the employer an affirmative duty to warn and should
impose liability when harm results from failure to warn.
A case like Muroc illustrates the principle of the disparate power
relationship. In Muroc, the referring school districts possessed
information that could have prevented harm to the plaintiff. Because
they knew what the plaintiff did not, namely that Robert Gadams had
a verifiable history of sexual misconduct that made it likely that he
would reoffend, they held power over the plaintiff. Had the school
districts disclosed that information to Fresno Pacific College, they
could have averted the harm to the plaintiff. Their failure to do so
increased the risk of harm to such an extent that it eventually became
a reality. Therefore, the relationship of disparate power between the
defendant school districts and the plaintiff justified imposing an
affirmative duty to warn and liability for the harm that the plaintiff
suffered.
Second, the relationship among employers, as embodied in the
benefit principle, should lead to the imposition of an affirmative duty
of disclosure. No one could seriously argue that former employers
receive a benefit from interacting with a former employee's potential
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victims. However, as discussed earlier, employers do receive substan-
tial benefits from accessing the employment reference system. The
information that employers receive from the reference system helps
them to hire the most competent employees. By hiring the most
competent employees, employers may limit their exposure to negligent
hiring liability. Thus, employers receive a benefit from the employ-
ment reference system in the form of decreased exposure to negligent
hiring claims.
The relationship among the school districts in Muroc shows the
benefit principle in action. Livingston Union School District, in which
the plaintiff was enrolled as a student, hired Gadams after accessing
the employment reference system and receiving information from his
previous employers via Fresno Pacific College. 17  Presumably,
Livingston accessed the system to choose a competent employee. Had
the system functioned properly and Gadams's former employers
disclosed full reference information about him, Livingston could have
received a substantial benefit by accessing the system: it could have
avoided hiring a potentially dangerous employee, thus averting the risk
of harm to the plaintiff while limiting its own exposure to negligent
hiring liability. Unfortunately, because of the former employers'
refusal to disclose information regarding Gadams's sexual misconduct,
the employment reference system failed.
By imposing on employers a duty to disclose information that
would make it reasonably foreseeable that an employee or former
employee poses a risk of harm to a potential victim, the negligent
employment referral theory will respond to the policy underlying tort
doctrine. First, the duty of disclosure will comport with the principle
of fault and foreseeability. Second, the duty of disclosure will give
effect to the relational principles of tort policy by recognizing both the
relationship of disparate power between an employer and a potential
victim and the relationship among employers who access the employ-
ment reference system.218
217. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 585.
218. Of course, countervailing policy considerations also support arguments against the
negligent employment referral theory. For example, in addition to those considered by the Muroc
court, see id. at n.201, the likely expansion of litigation and liability following the negligent
employment referral theory would probably have some economic impact on the community of
employers. However, any expansion of potential liability will have varying economic effects on
various segments of the economy. For instance, the advent of Section 402(A) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and strict products liability greatly impacted the potential liability of
manufacturers, distributors, and wholesalers. Despite any adverse economic impact, manufactur-
ers, distributors, and wholesalers continued to exist after the advent of strict products liability and,
at the time of this article, appeared to be thriving. Thus, concerns over generalized economic
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In addition to responding to the policy underlying tort law, the
negligent employment referral theory also responds to tort doctrine.
2. The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure and Tort Doctrine
By imposing on employers a duty to disclose information that
would make it reasonably foreseeable that an employee or former
employee poses a risk of harm, the negligent employment referral
theory will comport with tort doctrine while benefiting both employers
and potential victims of employees' misconduct.
a. The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure and the Tarasoff Rationale
The Muroc court unlocked the door to an affirmative duty of
disclosure by stating that "liability may not be imposed for mere
nondisclosure or other failure to act, at least in the absence of some
special relationship not alleged here." '219 Plaintiffs can employ the
California Supreme Court's rationale in Tarasoff to establish the special
relationship required by the Muroc court.22°
Admittedly, Tarasoff did not deal with an employment referral
action and no court has yet applied Tarasoff in a negligent referral
case. 221  However, commenting on the ubiquity of the Tarasoff
rationale, Professor Lake described Tarasoff as the "Palsgraf of its
generation, a case with meta-significance which endures beyond its
jurisdiction, time, place, and perhaps its particular holding. 222
Professors Adler & Peirce write that
Lake's conclusion stems, in part, from his sense that Tarasoff
challenges the traditional approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts that individuals generally owe no duty of aid or rescue to
others.223  As Lake sees it, the law is moving in the direction of
requiring citizens to take reasonable efforts to aid or protect others
when to do so would take little effort and would pose minimal
risk.224
effects often ignore their counterexamples. The true question that the law must address is at what
point society becomes willing to sacrifice the safety of innocent victims and the availability of
remedies to injured plaintiffs for the economic good of harmful actors. As decisions like Tarasoff
and Muroc suggest, no easy answer exists for that question. This Comment proposes one
solution.
219. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 589 (emphasis added).
220. See Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1660-63.
221. See id. at 1659.
222. Lake, supra note 146, at 98.
223. Id. at 100-01.
224. Adler & Pierce, supra note 68, at 1438.
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Other commentators, as discussed earlier, feel strongly that Tarasoff
provides an adequate basis for imposing an affirmative duty of
disclosure in the employment reference context.225
Tarasoff set out a three-part test that courts should apply when
faced with a claim alleging a failure to warn. The plaintiff in such a
case must establish that (1) a special relationship existed between the
defendant and either the potentially dangerous person or the third-
party victim, (2) the defendant's conduct caused a foreseeable risk of
harm to the victim, and (3) the potentially dangerous person harmed
an identifiable victim. 226  Plaintiffs in a negligent employment
referral case can satisfy each element of the Tarasoff test, beginning
with the special relationship requirement.
i. Special Relationship
Under the Tarasoff interpretation of Section 315 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, a special relationship between the defendant
and either (1) the potentially dangerous person, or (2) the third-party
victim will satisfy the special relationship requirement. The Tarasoff
court noted that no special relationship existed initially between the
psychotherapist and Tatiana Tarasoff.227 Therefore, the court turned
to consider the relationship between the psychotherapist and
Poddar.22 s With little explanation, the court summarily found the
psychotherapist-patient relationship sufficient to support a duty of
disclosure.229
To understand the Tarasoff court's reasoning, and to convincingly
analogize the employer-employee relationship to the psychotherapist-
patient relationship, one must look beyond the Tarasoff court's
summary conclusion that a special relationship exists between a
therapist and his or her patient and inquire further into the character
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship itself.
At the outset, the psychotherapist-patient relationship involves
only two players: the therapist and the patient. The relationship
exists for the purpose of treating the patient. Because the therapist
both provides and controls the patient's treatment, he or she functions
as the relationship's "master." To treat the patient, the therapist
225. See Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1660-63. See also Saxton, Flaws in the Laws, supra
note 7, at 91.
226. Swerdlow, supra note 17, at 1660.
227. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 343.
228. Id. at 343-44.
229. Id. at 345-46.
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requires information about the patient. In all probability, the therapist
acquires information from the patient that is irrelevant to either the
patient's treatment or to the duty of disclosure established in Tarasoff.
However, the therapist also acquires information crucial to both the
patient's treatment and the Tarasoff duty of disclosure. For instance,
the information in Tarasoff that Poddar intended to kill Tarasoff was
crucial to Poddar's treatment. More importantly, that dangerous
information triggered the therapist's duty to warn Tarasoff.
The therapist's role as master of the psychotherapist-patient
relationship may lead to a better understanding of the Tarasoff court's
reasoning. As stated above, the Tarasoff court did not inquire into the
special nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Rather, it
merely stated that the relationship was special and moved on.
However, because the master of the special relationship was also the
master of dangerous information, the court imposed on the psychother-
apist a duty of disclosing that information for the protection of the
potential victim."' Under Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
315, a duty to act for the protection of another presupposes a
relationship with the other." 1  Therefore, by both the Tarasoff
court's rules and by Section 315 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
the master's duty to disclose dangerous information for the protection
of a potential victim creates a relationship between the master and the
potential victim. Both the duty and the relationship arise when the
master acquires the dangerous information.
In Tarasoff, once the therapist acquired the dangerous informa-
tion, the number of relationships doubled. Not only did the therapist
have an ongoing relationship with his patient, but the therapist also
had a relationship with the potential victim of Poddar's harmful
conduct, Tarasoff. The second relationship arose from the fact that the
therapist possessed dangerous information which, if disclosed, would
have averted a risk of foreseeable harm to Tarasoff. Because the
therapist possessed the dangerous information as the master of the
relationship, the court imposed on him the duty to disclose.232
Although the Tarasoff court did not address the question of the
terminated psychotherapist-patient relationship, it seems unlikely that
it would relieve a therapist of the duty of disclosure after the relation-
ship ends. When the relationship ends, the therapist admittedly no
longer serves as master of the patient's treatment. However, the
230. Id.
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
232. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 345-46.
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therapist still serves as the master of the patient's dangerous informa-
tion. The therapist's acquisition of that information gave rise to a duty
to and relationship with the potential victim. Once a duty arises, the
person under that duty must either act reasonably to discharge it or
face liability for failure to do so. Thus, the termination of the
therapist's relationship with the patient does not extinguish the
therapist's relationship with the potential victim. Rather, the therapist-
victim relationship and its duty of disclosure continue intact because
the therapist continues as master of the dangerous information that
gave rise to the relationship in the first instance.
At the outset, the employer-employee relationship, much like that
between therapist and patient, involves only two players: the employer
and the employee. The employer controls the employment relationship
and directs the employee in his or her work. Therefore, although the
employer-employee relationship does not exist for the purpose of
treatment, the law recognizes the employer as the relationship's"master." During the course of the employment relationship, the
employer, like the therapist, acquires a wealth of information about the
employee. Some of the information is irrelevant to the employment
relationship. However, much like the therapist, the employer also
acquires information that could presumably trigger the Tarasoff duty
of disclosure. For instance, the employer might learn that a particular
employee is violent and assaultive after the employee threatens to
assault or actually assaults a coworker.
The employer's role as master becomes critical in analogizing the
employer-employee relationship to the psychotherapist-patient
relationship. As stated above, the Tarasoff court did not inquire into
the special nature of the psychotherapist-patient relationship. Rather,
it summarily stated that the law recognizes the special nature of the
relationship and gave no further information.23 Just as the law
recognizes the special nature of the psychotherapist-patient relation-
ship, it confers a special status on the employer-employee relationship.
Following Tarasoff's reasoning, the exact contours of the special
relationship do not dictate the duty of disclosure. Rather, in imposing
a duty of disclosure on the psychotherapist, the Tarasoff court
implicitly emphasized the therapist's status as the master of the
relationship. Under the Tarasoff rationale, the employer, much like the
psychotherapist, is the master of the special employer-employee
relationship. As the master of the relationship, the employer is also
233. Id. at 343.
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the master of any dangerous information acquired during the relation-ship.If one accepts the premise extracted from Tarasoff that the master
of a special relationship is under a duty to disclose dangerous
information for the protection of a potential victim, then the conclusion
follows that an employer, as master of the employer-employee
relationship, is under a duty to disclose dangerous information acquired
during the employment relationship for the protection of a potential
victim. As in Tarasoff, a duty to act for the benefit of another
presupposes a relationship with the other. Therefore, by both the
Tarasoff court's rules and by Section 315 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, the employer's duty to disclose dangerous information for the
protection of a potential victim would create a relationship between the
employer and the potential victim. Both the duty and the relationship
arise when the employer acquires the dangerous information.
In a case like Muroc, as in Tarasoff, once the employer acquires
the dangerous information, the number of relationships doubles. Not
only does the employer have an ongoing relationship with his or her
employee, but the employer also has a relationship with the potential
victim of the employee's harmful conduct. The second relationship
arises from the fact that the employer possesses dangerous information
which, if disclosed, would avert a risk of foreseeable harm to the
potential victim. Because the employer possesses the dangerous
information as the master of the relationship, the Tarasoff rationale
imposes on him the duty to disclose.
If the law imposes an initial duty of disclosure on an employer,
then it seems unlikely that it would relieve the employer of the duty
of disclosure after the employer-employee relationship ends. When the
relationship ends, the employer admittedly no longer serves as the
master of the employment relationship. However, the employer still
serves as the master of the employee's dangerous information. The
employer's acquisition of that information gave rise to a duty to and
relationship with the potential victim. Once a duty arises, the person
under that duty must either act reasonably to discharge it or face
liability for failure to do so. Thus, the termination of the employer's
relationship with the employee does not extinguish the employer's
relationship with the potential victim. Rather, the employer-victim
relationship and its duty of disclosure continues intact because the
employer continues as master of the dangerous information that gave
rise to the relationship in the first instance.
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ii. Foreseeable Risk of Harm
Foreseeability analogous to that in Tarasoff exists in the employ-
ment reference context as well. In Tarasoff, because Poddar told his
psychotherapist that he intended to kill Tarasoff, the court did not
address the issue of foreseeable harm.234  Rather, the court merged
the element of foreseeability into its analysis of the defendant
psychotherapist's relationship to his patient. 23 ' Thus, the court
provided little guidance as to how it would analyze foreseeability of
harm established with less certainty.
Foreseeability of imminent harm such as that found in Tarasoff
will rarely exist in the employment reference context. However, as
Professor Lake argues, the court's "special relationship caveat" allowed
it to unhook the foreseeability requirement from its analysis. 236
According to Lake, the result in Tarasoff "rest[ed] on a doctrinal
acceptance of 'special relationship' rules. ' 237  The Tarasoff result
implies that, because "special relationship rules permit liability based
on a duty of reasonable care, '238 foreseeability assumes secondary
importance in the Tarasoff duty calculus. If, as Professor Lake
reasons, the court's discussion of foreseeability was mere dicta,239
then courts considering a negligent employment referral claim could
follow the Tarasoff court and focus on the special relationship between
the defendant and either the potentially dangerous person or the
potential victim.
An argument based on Professor Lake's "unhooking forseeability
into dicta" theory might appear fatuous until one looks closely at the
rationale of the Muroc court. Although foreseeability like that in
Tarasoff did not exist in Muroc, the Muroc court had little trouble
finding it. The court stated that
[a]lthough the chain of causation leading from defendants' state-
ments and omissions to Gadams's alleged assault on plaintiff is
somewhat attenuated, we think the assault was reasonably foresee-
able. Based on the facts alleged in the complaint, defendants could
foresee that Livingston's officers would read and rely on defendants'
letters in deciding to hire Gadams. Likewise, defendants could
foresee that, had they not unqualifiedly recommended Gadams,
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Lake, supra note 146, at 109.
237. Id. at 123.
238. Id. at 124.
239. Id.
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Livingston would not have hired him. And finally, defendants could
foresee that Gadams, after being hired by Livingston, might molest or
injure a Livingston student such as plaintiff.24 °
If the defendants, who no longer employed Gadams, could foresee
that he might molest or injure a student in the future, then they must
have foreseen that conduct because they possessed dangerous informa-
tion about Gadams that indicated his propensity to harm students.
The defendants necessarily acquired that information during their
employer-employee relationship with Gadams. By finding foreseeabili-
ty in this manner, the court implicitly acknowledged the special
relationship between the defendants and the potential victim, Randi W.
Applying Professor Lake's "unhooking foreseeability into dicta" theory,
the special relationship between employer and potential victim, much
as the special relationship that this article postulates existed between
the psychotherapist and Tatiana Tarasoff, leads to foreseeability in the
employment reference context.
Undoubtedly, situations will arise in which the chain of causation
between a former employer's failure to disclose reference information
and a victim's physical harm will appear even more attenuated than
that in Muroc. Such cases raise the troubling question of whether the
negligent employment referral theory would allow the duty of
disclosure and the former employer's potential liability to continue
indefinitely.
The facts of Cohen v. Wales,24" ' discussed earlier, raised the issue
of indefinite liability. In Cohen, the defendant school district's former
employee assaulted a student eleven years after the defendant provided
a favorable recommendation.242  The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant failed to disclose in the recommendation that they charged
the employee with sexual misconduct during his employment with
them.243 Because the court relied on the "no duty to act" rule in
reaching its decision, 2" it did not discuss the lapse of time between
referral and assault.
However, the court in Gutzan specifically addressed the lapse of
time between the defendant's recommendation of the employee and the
employee's misconduct. In Gutzan, the employee raped his coworker
approximately one year after the defendant employment agency
240. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 589 (emphasis added).
241. 518 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
242. Id. at 633-34.
243. Id. at 633.
244. Id. at 634.
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recommended him to his employer. 24' Although the trial court had
reasoned that the duty shifted from the defendant employment agency
to the employer, the appellate court drew on Section 452 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts in finding that the duty did not
shift. 246 Section 452 states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the failure of a third person
to act to prevent harm to another threatened by the actor's
negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of such harm.
(2) Where, because of lapse of time or otherwise, the duty to prevent
harm to another threatened by the actor's negligent conduct is
found to have shifted from the actor to a third person, the
failure of the third person to prevent such harm is a supersed-
ing cause.247
The Gutzan court reasoned that, under the circumstances of the
case, a lapse of one year did not shift the duty to protect the plaintiff
from the defendant employment agency to the employer.248
Although the Gutzan court found one year insufficient to shift the
duty to the employer, Section 452 recognizes that a sufficient lapse of
time would shift the duty of care from one party to another.249
Comment F to Section 452 states that "when, by the interplay of such
factors [as the third party's relationship with the plaintiff and the lapse
of time] the court finds that full responsibility for control of the
situation and prevention of the threatened harm has passed to the third
person, his failure to act is then a superseding cause, which will relieve
the original actor of liability."2 '
Under the theory of negligent employment referral, a sufficient
lapse of time between a defendant employer's failure to disclose and
the former employee's misconduct would likely relieve the former
employer of liability. Such a decision would be highly fact-specific and
would depend, as suggested by comment f of Section 452, on the
relationship between the employer and the injured victim. Where the
former employee harms a coworker, the employer-employee relation-
ship between the coworker and the current employer, coupled with an
appreciable lapse of time, would likely trigger Section 452 and shift the
245. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 138.
246. Id. at 140.
247. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452 (1965) (emphasis added).
248. Gutzan, 766 F.2d at 141.
249. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452 (1965).
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965).
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liability to the current employer.25' The same would hold true where
the former employee harms a customer of the current employer." 2
Section 452 does not offer a mechanical formula for determining
when the duty to protect a potential victim would shift from a former
employer to a current employer. However, it does offer a defense to
a former employer who recommended the dangerous former employee
years prior to the misconduct at issue. Therefore, the duty imposed
by the negligent employment referral theory would not allow the
former employer's potential liability to continue indefinitely.
iii. Identifiable Victim
Finally, plaintiffs in a negligent employment referral case can
satisfy the Tarasoff contextual identifiability requirement. In Tarasoff,
the victim became readily identifiable once Poddar revealed his
intention to kill her to the defendant psychotherapist. Thus, the court
never applied its identifiability requirement. However, in Thompson,
the same court applied the identifiability requirement, but with a result
different than that in Tarasoff.
Plaintiffs injured by an employee's tortious conduct are readily
identifiable victims under the Thompson application of the Tarasoff
identifiability requirement. In Thompson, the court reasoned that the
government must itself, or through the local police, warn each and
every potential identifiable victim of a parolee's misconduct to
discharge the proposed duty of disclosure." 3 Because an attempt to
warn each and every potential victim in Thompson required too much
effort in return for too little protection, the court reasoned that the
plaintiff did not satisfy the Tarasoff identifiability requirement.254
Unlike the defendant in Thompson, a defendant in a negligent
employment referral case may discharge the duty of disclosure by
warning one person: the prospective employer or an intermediary.
251. The master-servant relationship imposes on an employer a duty of care for the safety
of his or her employees. . See, e.g., Lillie v. Thompson, 332 U.S. 459, 461 (1947); Bartlett v.
Hantover, 9 Wash. App. 614, 620-21, 513 P.2d 844, 849 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 84 Wash.
2d 426, 526 P.2d 1217 (1974).
252. For example, a business owner owes a business invitee, such as a customer, a duty of
reasonable care. See, e.g., Graves v. Grady's Inc., 906 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that "a business owner has an obligation to exercise ordinary care and diligence in
maintaining his premises in a safe condition for invitees, and is under an affirmation duty 'to
protect invitees, among them business visitors, not only against dangers of which they know, but
also against those which with reasonable care they might discover."' (quoting McCormack v.
Waters, 594 S.W.2d 388, 387 (Tenn. 1980)).
253. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 735 (Cal. 1980).
254. Id.
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That single warning requires little effort in return for great protection.
Armed with such knowledge, the prospective employer may choose not
to hire the employee, thus denying the employee the chance to harm
innocent victims. On the other hand, if the prospective employer hires
the employee, she can take extra precautions to protect customers and
other employees. 255  Most important for the defendant employer,
once she discharges the duty of disclosure, the prospective employer
will bear any future liability if she hires the employee and the
employee harms an innocent victim.
Notwithstanding the Thompson application of the identifiability
requirement, the Muroc rule does not require a plaintiff to establish a
particular victim's identity. Rather, the Muroc court stated that "a
court's task ... is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury
was reasonably foreseeable." '256  Instead, the correct inquiry is
whether a particular category of negligent conduct would likely result
in the kind of harm of which the plaintiff complains. 27  If so, then
the court may impose liability where the plaintiff establishes the other
required elements of duty.258  In other words, a particular victim's
identity is irrelevant under Muroc so long as the victim falls within an
identifiable class of potential victims.
255. A valid argument exists that employers may prefer to take no precautions and simply
refuse to hire potentially dangerous employees, thus creating a class of "unhireables." However,
tort law, like all law, represents society's attempt not only to provide remedies to aggrieved
plaintiffs but also to shape human behavior. If potentially violent employees learn through
painful experience that employers will not hire them, then the negligent employment referral
theory may shape their behavior so that they no longer engage in violent or dangerous conduct
in the workplace. Thus, to the extent that the negligent employment referral theory discourages
an employee's violent or dangerous conduct, it will have surpassed its initial goals.
Of course, that rationale becomes less persuasive where employers overdisclose potentially
defamatory reference information. Such overdisclosure could result in a class of unjustly accused
unhireables. The negligent employment referral theory recognizes and addresses the danger of
overdisclosure by imposing limits on the information which an employer may disclose. See
discussion infra Part III.B.2.b.
256. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 588-89 (quoting Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6 (Cal.
1986)) (emphasis added).
257. Id.
258. Id. The Muroc court points to the court's rationale in Rowland v. Christian as an
example of the additional elements that courts should consider when departing from a general rule
in imposing a duty on a defendant: "'the major [considerations] are the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to
the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the
defendants and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved."'
Muroc, 929 P.2d at 588, (quoting Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)) (emphasis
added by the court). The Muroc court applied and analyzed each element of the Rowland duty
formulation.
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By amalgamating and applying the Tarasoff and Muroc rationales,
the law can and should impose on employers an affirmative duty of
disclosure. Tort doctrine, and Tarasoff, supports an affirmative duty
of disclosure where a current employer-employee relationship exists.
Additionally, the combined rationales of Tarasoff and Muroc will
support an affirmative duty of disclosure after the employment
relationship ends. First, the special relationship called for by the
Muroc court exists under the Tarasoff test. Second, although the
special relationship requirement in Tarasoff subsumed the court's
foreseeability analysis, the Muroc court held that foreseeability of harm
exists in the employment reference context. Finally, the potential
victims of a former employee's tortious conduct fall within an
identifiable class of victims under both the Tarasoff/ Thompson and
Muroc rationales.
b. The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure and the Defamation Claim
Although the proposed negligent employment referral claim
imposes an affirmative duty of disclosure on employers, they may
discharge that duty without increased exposure to defamation liability.
As discussed earlier, truth is an absolute defense to a defamation
claim.2"9 The proposed negligent employment referral claim will
require disclosure only where the employer can reasonably foresee that
an employee or former employee poses a risk of physical harm to a
prospective employer or a third person. In most, if not all cases,
reasonable foreseeability will follow from confirmed or documented
instances of employee misconduct. Thus, in discharging his or her
duty, the employer need only truthfully disclose information regarding
verifiable and documented misconduct.
For example, the plaintiffs in Muroc alleged that the defendant
school districts failed to disclose verifiable instances of Gadams's sexual
misconduct to the placement office of Fresno Pacific College.26° As
an initial matter, a negligent employment reference claim would operate
here because each school district provided information to Fresno
Pacific on request. More importantly, the school districts could have
disclosed information regarding Gadams's verifiable sexual misconduct
to Fresno Pacific College without facing defamation liability under the
negligent employment referral theory. Their truthful disclosure of
Gadams's verifiable misconduct would have defeated a defamation
claim.
259. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1965).
260. Muroc, 929 P.2d at 585.
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Arguably, given the increasing number of employment-based
defamation actions, the truth defense does little to discourage defama-
tion actions against employers. However, such an argument misses the
point of the truth defense. Truth serves as an absolute defense to a
defamation claim and will defeat defamation liability.261 Truth will
never defeat a plaintiff s bare ability to bring a defamation action. The
only thing that will defeat a plaintiffs ability to bring a defamation
action is his or her inability to find counsel willing to take the case.
While counsel might hesitate to take a plaintiffs defamation case for
many reasons, key among those is the plaintiffs actual ability to
prevail on the claim or to force a reasonable settlement. Under the
negligent employment referral theory, the employer can foreclose the
plaintiffs ability to prevail on his or her claim where the employer
truthfully disclosed only verifiable and documented misconduct. If
counsel thoroughly investigates the plaintiffs case before filing suit and
learns that the employer truthfully disclosed only verifiable and
documented misconduct, then the employer's ability to foreclose the
plaintiffs ability to prevail might discourage reasonable counsel from
filing the action. Thus, given broad applicability, the negligent
employment referral theory could discourage filing of all but the most
meritorious defamation actions.
Moreover, by encouraging employers to take special care when
disclosing unfavorable reference information, the negligent employment
referral theory would further discourage baseless defamation actions.
Under the negligent employment referral theory, if the employer
disclosed allegedly defamatory information beyond verifiable and
documented misconduct, then the plaintiff may rightfully prevail in his
or her defamation action. Thus, the theory would serve as an incentive
for employers to tailor their reference practices to avoid disclosing
unfavorable information beyond verifiable, documented miscon-
duct.262 Careful management of reference information disclosure will
261. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1965).
262. Difficulties may arise where an employee is the subject of an investigation based on
allegations of misconduct by his or her current employer. The difficulty arises because, while the
fact of the investigation itself is arguably verifiable and documented, the employer may conclude
after the investigation that the employee did not engage in the alleged misconduct. In such a case,
the "verifiable and documented" requirement contemplates misconduct which the employer
concludes actually occurred. Therefore, an employer should not disclose the fact of an ongoing
investigation if a prospective employer requests reference information on the employee.
Of course, an employer may best conclude that an employee engaged in misconduct by
completing a formal investigation documenting allegations, findings, and conclusions. However,
not all employers can or will perform such formal, quasi-adjudicatory investigations. In those
cases, the "verifiable and documented" requirement contemplates at least a reasonable process for
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better allow employers to foreclose a plaintiffs defamation claim. As
stated above, the employer's ability to foreclose the plaintiffs
defamation claim might discourage reasonable counsel from filing the
plaintiffs defamation action.
c. The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure and the
Negligent Hiring Claim
Placing an affirmative duty of disclosure on the community of
employers as a whole will increase the likelihood of individual
employers successfully defending against negligent hiring claims.
As discussed earlier, employers must adequately and reasonably
investigate a prospective employee's background to avoid liability for
negligent hiring.163  Unless employers fully disclose reference infor-
mation, prospective employers cannot adequately investigate a
prospective employee's background. However, the negligent employ-
ment referral theory imposes an affirmative duty on employers to
disclose information regarding verifiable instances of misconduct to
prospective employers or intermediaries on request. Prospective
employers armed with that information may avoid hiring potentially
dangerous employees. By refusing to hire dangerous employees,
employers not only will avoid liability for negligent hiring but will also
protect innocent victims from potential harm.
For instance, defendants such as those in Muroc would respond
differently if they knew that they faced possible liability for negligent
employment referral. In Muroc, the referring school districts func-
tioned under the "no duty to warn" presumption when they responded
to Fresno Pacific's request for Gadams's recommendation. Unfortu-
nately for both the plaintiff and the school district that hired Gadams,
the school district's reliance on that presumption resulted in the sexual
assault on the plaintiff. Had the referring school districts known that
they faced possible liability for negligent employment referral, the duty
of disclosure would have motivated them to disclose Gadams's
misconduct. If the referring school districts had disclosed Gadams's
misconduct, then the district that hired Gadams could have refused to
determining whether or not the employee actually engaged in the alleged misconduct. By
requiring a reasonable investigation, the "verifiable and documented" requirement will protect
both the employee from defamatory references and the employer from exposure to liability for
disclosing potentially defamatory information. Moreover, because employers do not typically have
the same insight into human behavior as did the psychotherapist in Tarasoff, the "verifiable and
documented" requirement provides the employer with some objective method of assessing an
employee's potential for harm.
263. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 68, at 1385.
1998]
Seattle University Law Review
hire him in the first instance. Randi W. would not have been injured,
and no lawsuit would have followed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Existing theories of liability for negligent referral do little to
encourage employers to disclose reference information that could
prevent harm to potential victims. Even the controversial Muroc rule
allows employers the option of disclosing only name, rank, and serial
number information or of remaining silent altogether.
The law can best encourage the disclosure of reference information
by imposing an affirmative duty of disclosure on employers. Under
that duty, an employer should provide reference information to
prospective employers or intermediaries on request. However, the duty
would arise only when the employer possesses verifiable information
that would make it reasonably foreseeable that an employee or former
employee poses a risk of physical harm to a prospective employer or
a third person.
In addition to comporting with tort policy and doctrine, such a
duty will accomplish two important objectives. First, it will reduce
the number of negligent hiring claims brought against employers.
Second, and most important, it will protect innocent victims from
potential harm. Moreover, the duty will accomplish both objectives
without exposing employers to increased defamation liability. Thus,
under the negligent employment referral theory's duty of disclosure,
employers can have their cake and eat it, too.
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